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Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile
Defense and Permissible Harming
In Helen Frowe's book, Defensive Killing, she argues that some cases of seemingly futile selfdefense are actually instances of justifiable defense of the victim's honor. This paper explores
Frowe's claim, first by isolating the central cases and then by examining her rejection of punitive
reasons. From there, the paper examines Frowe's understanding of "defense of honor,"
ultimately suggesting that Frowe's conception is best construed as action that has expressive, but
not defensive, value. From there, I turn to two more general puzzles. First, what if the defender
mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, but the reason that
actually supports her action is not one she is acting in light of? And, second, how ought we to
understand the interests of an aggressor who has forfeited his rights?

Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing, self-defense, honor, necessity
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*This is the draft that was submitted to the Journal of Moral Philosophy. For copyright reasons,
I cannot post the final version, accepted on March 3, 2017. Some corrections and amendments
were made to the discussion that follows. For a final version, please refer to the journal.
Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile
Defense and Permissible Harming
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

There is an intuitive sense that even when, as the Star-Trek villains “The Borg” would
say, “Resistance is futile,” defensive force remains permissible. A woman, unable to prevent a
rape, does not seem to wrong her attacker by breaking his wrist. The Warsaw ghetto uprising
seems honorable, even though the “defenders” knew their resistance was in vain. And, as
Danny Statman notes, we cheer for John Wayne cowboy movies where, even when they are
surrounded, we think the heroes do right by taking their last stand. 1
Should we conclude that defensive force need not be necessary? This would be too
quick. Whereas these futile defenses seem permissible, other acts of unnecessary defense do not.
May I shoot a culpable aggressor when I can safely escape? It seems that I would act
impermissibly in so doing.
These cases are distinct, despite the fact that in both instances, defensive force is in some
sense unnecessary. In the first, the defensive force appears ineffective (and thereby unnecessary
because it is not sufficient to stop the attack), whereas, in the second, the defensive force would
be sufficient but remains unnecessary to prevent harm to the victim.
In her book, Helen Frowe claims that some acts of ineffective defense are not ineffective
after all. Rather, some force may be proportionate to defending the victim’s honor. She is further
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willing to extend this defense of honor to cases of the second type, allowing some harm to
attackers even when victims can safely retreat.
In this paper, I begin by setting forth the central case of futile defense and eliminating
distracting cases that misunderstand the nature and justification of self-defense. I then consider
one justification for harming in futile defense cases that Frowe rejects: punitive reasons. I argue
that punitive reasons can justify harming the attacker in futile defense cases and show that
Frowe’s deferred harming objection to punitive reasons fails. From there, I consider Frowe’s
claim that some force is justified because the victim is defending her honor. I find this claim to
be undertheorized and thus address different conceptions and claims about honor that may be at
work.
After suggesting that Frowe’s conception of “defending honor” is best construed as
action that has expressive, but not defensive, value, I turn to two more general puzzles implicated
by these unnecessary defense cases. The first is the problem of mismatch. What if the defender
mistakenly believes that she can successfully defend and acts for that reason, but the reason that
actually supports her action is not one she is acting in light of? That is, may the defender avail
herself of punitive reasons if what she aims to do is defend herself? The second puzzle is how to
understand the interests of an aggressor who has forfeited his rights. Frowe seems to believe that
these interests may be asserted by the aggressor in a lesser-evils calculation. In contrast, I
maintain that aggressors who have forfeited rights cannot assert the interests that were protected
by those rights.

I.

Futile Defense Cases: The Central Case and Question
Within the category of futile defense cases, it is important to put one class of cases to the

side at the outset. As Frowe rightly observes (111) and as was previously noted by David
Rodin,2 one need not do any fancy footwork to explain why Alice, who is threatened to be raped
by five men, may kill three, even though she will still be raped. Rights are relational. Alice gets
to prevent Bob from raping her, even if Carl still will. Hence, some of the cases suggested by
Statman do not require a resort to defending honor to resolve them.

2

David Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’, Ethics 122 (2011), pp. 74-110, p.92; see also F.M. Kamm, ‘Self-Defense, Resistance
and Suicide: The Taliban Women’, in Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (eds.), How We Fight: Ethics in War (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 75-86.

3

Because multiple attacker cases, where force is not futile against specific rights
violations, contaminate our intuitions about some instances of unnecessary force, let us focus on
one of Frowe’s cases (originally imagined by Joanna Mary Firth and Jonathan Quong 3) that
offers a pure example of futile defense.
Rape: Eric is in the midst of culpably raping Fran. Eric is much bigger and stronger
than Fran, and consequently there is nothing she can do to stop him from
continuing to rape her. While being raped, Fran threatens to break Eric’s wrist,
though this will do nothing to stop the rape from occurring. The only way Eric
can stop Fran from breaking his wrist is to quickly break her wrist first. (99).
One immediate question is whether Fran believes that her action will stop the attack. I
will return to this issue later. For now, let us proceed on Frowe’s assumption that Fran knows
that breaking Eric’s wrist cannot prevent the rape. That is, we begin with the assumption that
Fran does not think there is even the slightest chance that she can be successful, and thus, her
action is not being done with the intention of defending herself against the sexual assault.

II.

Punitive reasons
The question at hand is whether Fran is permitted to break Eric’s wrist, particularly given

the concern that if she is not so permitted, Eric might have the right to fight back and stop her. I
think it is extremely plausible that punitive reasons do exist that support Fran’s actions and that
Frowe has not successfully ruled such reasons out of consideration.
Frowe considers but dismisses what she calls “punitive reasons,” including desert (106)
and deterrence (107). "But although punishment is the most obvious candidate for justification
for harming Eric, it fails to provide a satisfactory justification for inflicting harm in the cases
under discussion." (107).
She finds two objections to punitive reasons accounts to be surmountable. She believes
the concern that private individuals can’t usually punish is not inherently problematic; after all,
the aggressor is liable to the harm, and any punishment received by aggressor at the hands of the
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defender can be deducted from the state’s ultimate imposition of sentence. 4 (107). Second, one
may worry that private citizens will get the wrong guy, but during the rape itself, Fran isn’t likely
to make a mistake about her attacker. According to Frowe, this too is a surmountable objection.
(107).
Frowe's central objection is that punitive reasons don’t seem to rule out "deferred
harming." Why can't Fran break Eric's wrist the next day? "Liability to punishment is triggered
by engaging in wrongdoing, but persists once the wrongdoing has ceased." (107). How can the
reason that applies to letting the state be the one to punish attackers "somehow get stronger once
the attack has ended[?] But it's hard to see why this would be the case--unlike defensive action,
there's typically no urgency about punitive measures." (108) Given that we would not let her
punish him later (we would insist that the state do it), why let her punish him now? It seems like
indulging vigilante justice.
Frowe then just concludes: “If we do not think that Murderer and Eric are liable to suffer
deferred harm at the hands of their victims, we will need to reject punishment as the source of a
liability to non-defensive harm.” (109) Either Frowe is rejecting that punitive reasons exist or
she is rejecting that they are available to Fran. I find neither claim plausible.
To deny that punitive reasons exist is to reject that punitive reasons are generated during
the rape. This can’t be true. Consider first desert. Eric, by virtue of his culpable wrongdoing,
deserves to be punished. If so, then this reason exists at the time of the rape. What about
deterrence? The case is both stronger and weaker. Deterrence is empirically contingent and thus
the reason may not obtain at all.5 The reason will exist when it deters and won’t when it doesn’t.
In that sense the case is weaker. But when the reason does exist, there is no doubt that it exists
during the rape itself. Hence, even if you think that “punishment” requires the state, deterring
aggression clearly does not.
The fact that these reasons do exist does create the puzzle of deferred harming. So, how
might we account for the fact that Fran can’t punish Eric later? To my mind, the best account
would be one that draws on the state’s role (and possible monopoly) on punishment. What Fran
does wrong—if she acts wrongfully at all—is to take over the state’s role, but her action does not
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violate Eric’s rights. Moreover, there is certainly room for a theory of the state that holds that an
individual, while being attacked by a wrongdoer and unprotected by the state—is simply not
governed by the social contract to leave punishment to the state. After all, at that moment, there
is not a functioning state that is holding up its end of the bargain by protecting her. 6 Indeed, I
have argued that the reason why we applaud vigilantes in popular culture where the hero is
provoked (my favorite is Russell Crowe’s killing of Joaquin Phoenix in Gladiator) is because
these are cases where not only does the bad guy have a lot of desert long overdue but also the
state has wholly failed to give the bad guy what he deserves (in Gladiator, the bad guy is the
state).7 We may thus think that in the absence of a state the protects her right now, Fran may be
permitted to punish Eric.8
We may think that after Rape, Fran has rule of law reasons to defer to the state. If she
went and broke his wrist the next week, then, it isn’t that the desert reason operates less strongly
– it doesn’t. But the fear that there will be downstream effects that others might retaliate in
mistaken situations, combined with a general belief that the state is just, operate to require Fran
to stay her hand. That said, if she breaks his wrist, I still think he fully deserves it.
Now, perhaps Frowe’s quick conclusion was meant to say not that these reasons do not
exist but that they are never available to Fran. Fran is not entitled to punish. Given that Frowe
explicitly rejects the argument that “we don’t typically allow private individuals to dish out
punishment” (107), just two pages prior, such a move is not supported by the text. More
importantly, the question of whether Fran wrongs Eric by giving him what he deserves is simply
a different question from whether Fran violates the social contract by not ceding authority to the
state.
The more difficult question, and one to which I will return in a bit, is what intention Fran
must have while harming Eric. That is, a better argument Frowe could make against access to
punitive reasons is that an action cannot be considered punitive unless the harm is inflicted with
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the intention to punish. There is thus a possibility of a mismatch between Fran’s reasons for
imposing harm and the reasons that might support it. I will return to this mismatch question in
what follows.

III.

Defending Honor
A. Frowe’s Account
Frowe argues that defending honor is a better explanation for our intuitions that futile

defensive actions are permissible. They are not futile after all! Fran is successfully defending
her honor. In articulating how this might be so, she endorses Statman’s claim that “in the eyes of
the aggressor, we are just items to be used, mere objects.” (109) 9 And, she approvingly cites
Barbara Herman’s formulation that one may defend against an aggressor because he “would use
me (take my life) for his purposes.” (110)10
From here Frowe does a bit of synthesis and extrapolation, maintaining this sort of
argument only applies to “culpable aggressors” who “demonstrate some inappropriate lack of
regard” for the victim. (110). Understanding what is at stake in the attack is essential to
determining what sort of response is proportionate. Here, Frowe concurs with Statman’s
assessment that the attack on honor is correlated with the gravity of the underlying threat:
The gravity of the threat to honour is likely to increase as the seriousness of the primary
threat increases because a threat to honour is about the wrongness of thinking that one
may do this sort of thing to one’s victim. The worse that one is treating one’s victim in
terms of the primary threat, the more one denies her status as a person deserving of a
certain sort of consideration. Thinking that you are the sort of thing that I can slap
because I feel like slapping you is not as significant a threat to your honour as thinking
that you are the sort of thing I can rape or kill or seriously assault because I feel like
raping, killing, or seriously assaulting you. (112).
Frowe concludes that threats to honor are not as bad as the primary threats. Even when
the primary threat is rape or killing, she argues, contra Statman, that the corresponding threat to
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honor only justifies imposition of “moderate harm like a broken wrist or arm.” (112-13). 11 More
force would not be proportionate, Frowe asserts, because the defensive harm is conveying one’s
assertion that one will not be passive and complicit and that one is a person worthy of better
treatment. (113). Moreover, defending honor comes with its own success, as it is in the trying
that one reasserts one’s dignity. (114).
Frowe is cognizant of the fact that she must offer a limit to defending honor, lest the
“deferred harming” objection hoist her on her own petard. She suggests that to the extent that
the threat to honor supervenes on the primary harm, then the threat to honor is over when the
primary threat is over. (113). The defender might seek restoration of honor but she cannot
prevent the harm done. (114).
Frowe then considers further extensions of defending honor to instances in which force is
unnecessary because lesser means are available to the defender:
Lucky Escape: Murderer is shooting at Victim to try to kill him because he dislikes
Victim. He chases Victim to the edge of a cliff. Unbeknownst to
Murderer, Victim has both a gun and a parachute. He can thus save his
own life by either (a) jumping to safety, using no force against Murderer,
or (b) shooting and killing Murderer.
Because Frowe takes necessity to be an external restriction on the use of permissible selfdefense, she claims that Murderer is liable to defensive force so he cannot kill the Victim in
counter-defense, but Victim still acts impermissibly in shooting him. (117). Hence, according to
Frowe, even if culpable aggressors have forfeited their rights, it is still not all-things-considered
permissible to kill them unnecessarily. (117).12
Despite the fact that Murderer is not liable to being killed, Frowe maintains that “some
harm inflicted on Murderer can be necessary as a means of Victim’s defending his honour.”
(117) “Since Murderer poses a lethal threat, it will be proportionate for Victim to inflict quite
significant harm to defend his honour, and thus a substantial component of the lethal harm
Victim inflicts will satisfy the necessity constraint.” (117). Because Murderer is liable to some
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successful harm by Victim’s defending his honor, Murderer is entitled to use force only to the
extent that Victim’s force is disproportionate to the honor defense.
B. Assessing Honor
I am sympathetic to the idea that we may use a mild amount of force to defend our honor
and dignity. That said, I find Frowe’s account to be problematic and undertheorized in several
respects. Admittedly, Frowe’s book seeks to accomplish quite a bit in a short number of pages,
but before one signs onto the “Hooray for Fran and her honor!” account of our intuitions, let me
set forth some cautionary questions and see if we can tease out different notions of honor and
defending honor that may be at play.
1. What does it mean to threaten honor?
In Rape, there are a two distinct factors that inform our view that Fran is defending her
honor and Frowe focuses on both of them. One factor is that rape entails using another person as
a means. The second is that Eric is culpable.
It does not seem that “using” is necessary to constitute an attack on honor if attacking
honor is to be understood as manifesting a disrespectful attitude. Consider a purposeful
eliminative killing. What if a woman, jealous that her boyfriend has dumped her for another,
shoots her competitor dead in order to be with the man of her dreams? The killing here is clearly
eliminative, not opportunistic. She does not want to disrespect this woman; she just wants this
other woman to go away. Are eliminative killings threats to honor? Frowe states:
Thinking that you are the sort of thing that I can slap because I feel like slapping you is
not as significant a threat to your honour as thinking that you are the sort of thing I can
rape or kill or seriously assault because I feel like raping, killing, or seriously assaulting
you. (112).
This argument seems to presuppose that the aggressor is harming the victim as a means to
some end if only the end of feeling like deriving pleasure from harming the victim. However,
Frowe also seems to think that attacks on honor are actions that reveal culpable disregard for
others, that is, showing insufficient concern for others’ interests. In that case, honor is attacked
whenever the victim is intentionally harmed.
9

From here, it seems that we might be inclined to find that lesser culpability also counts,
including recklessness. What if I speed home to catch the most recent episode of my favorite
soap opera, thus imposing a risk on you as a pedestrian? If you can’t stop me from
unintentionally, but recklessly, rendering you quadriplegic, can you break my wrist and say,
“You can run me over, but you can’t take my honor!”? Are attacks on honor just culpability by
another name?13
Larry Alexander and I have argued that culpability is manifesting insufficient concern for
another’s interests.14 It seems that the idea that Frowe is after here is not opportunistic use but
rather the manifestation of an attitude that the victim does not count. It is that disrespect to
which the victim is responding.
2. What is the relationship between an attack on honor and the primary harm?
To this point, we might think that the sort of disrespect embodied in an attack need not
entail using a person and includes culpable attacks on others. One might then wonder whether
culpable attacks, even if they don’t cause harm themselves, still constitute attacks on honor such
that one may harm culpable attempters. Statman suggests that when honor stands alone, it will
justify some use of force, just not the use of deadly force that he took to be proportionate when
honor was parasitic on a primary harm. An implication of Frowe’s claim that one can defend
honor in Lucky Escape is that honor is itself sufficient for some defensive force. Indeed, at one
point, she claims the difference between inchoate and choate crimes is the difference between
just insulting your honor and insulting your honor and harming you. But that would mean that if
I intend to kill Helen, point a gun at her, and she knows the gun is unloaded (but I do not), she is
permitted to harm me to prevent me from pulling the trigger so that she might defend her honor.
Do I really succeed in dishonoring her if I fail in my attempt? I reveal that I am culpable and do
13

Frances Kamm argues that “mere resistance” is permissible in response to unjust attacks, even when the
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with gun is liable to defensive action because attack is unjust and individuals may engage in “mere resistance”
against unjust acts). Kamm takes there to be value in responding to wrongdoing. Still, where the aggressor is not
culpably manifesting disrespect, it is harder to get a handle on why nonculpable aggressors (such as a child who
believes a gun is a toy) may be harmed just for “standing up to unjust acts,” in instances where the harm serves
neither defensive nor punishment goals. Because responding to Kamm’s view, which Frowe does not discuss,
would take us too far afield, I will focus only on the view of honor that Frowe appears to be endorsing.
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not respect her but is she truly permitted to break my wrist just to stop me from pulling the
trigger of an unloaded gun which will reveal that I disrespect her? As a matter of reporting one’s
intuitions, I will admit that I find it far less plausible that one is entitled to use force to defend
one’s honor when one knows that no harm is at issue.
On the other hand, tying honor to the primary harm seems to create the opposite problem
which is whether the attack on honor can be thwarted if the primary harm is not. Consider the
claim by John Gardner and Stephen Shute that the wrong of rape just is the opportunistic use.15
Admittedly, there is something decidedly odd about disregarding the harms inherent in rape as
mere epiphenomena.16 Still, if the most abhorrent thing about rape is the use of a person as a
means and that cannot be stopped, in what sense is honor truly being defended?
3. Honor and expressive value
Maybe we should not think of “defending honor” as being the same sort of action as other
sorts of defensive force. That is, rather than thinking that the harming of the aggressor somehow
averts a threat to honor in the way that we think physical harms avert physical threats, perhaps
defending honor is more expressive than defensive. I think Frowe equivocates a bit on her
conception. Frowe does seem to view the conduct as “defending honor,” as she mentions force
that is “proportionate to averting the threat to honor” (112) and “defend[ing] herself against a
threat to her honour.” (114) These phrases indicate that the conduct will avert the harm.
However, other passages point toward a more expressive view:
When we think about what it is that such harms try to convey—a refusal to be passive, a
refusal to be complicit, a means of asserting oneself as a person worthy of better
treatment—it seems that even in the face of a serious threat to one’s honor, such as that
present during rape inflicting a moderate harm upon one’s attacker (a broken limb, for
example) would suffice to manifest such an attitude which is what constitutes the defense
of one’s honour. (113)

15
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In this sense, “fighting back” has intrinsic expressive value. It therefore comes with its
own success condition, as merely by fighting back one is (re)asserting one’s worth.
This idea is deeply entrenched. We have a number of norms that take it to be valuable to
fight in the face of futility. In the face of the opposing team’s inevitable victory, every parent
teaches her child to play the game out. You don’t quit, give up, throw in the towel, but instead,
you play your best even if the face of certain defeat. And, we think that this strength of will and
determination are valuable character traits. This may be the same ethos that supports thoughts
such that one should not “go gentle into that good night.” We see value in the act when you
“rage, rage against the dying of the light.”
Part of the rationale for why such “resistance” is valuable may trade on the thought that
one ought not to give up or resign oneself to failure. This may in fact color our intuition that
Fran may fight back. We might think that she can’t know that defensive force will not work.
She should still try to stop Eric. It might work! Still, as a parent who has sat through too many
children’s sporting events, sometimes one team knows they are going to lose and we still see the
value in fighting until the end.
In thinking about the value in this “resistance,” we can also gain some insight by looking
at its converse—not fighting back. Both Herman and Frowe use the term—complicit—to denote
one’s role in the injury to oneself if one does not fight back. In some ways, this is a staggering
accusation. Someone hurts me and if I don’t fight back, I am part of the problem! I’m hurting
myself! This claim is conceptually and normatively unattractive. Conceptually, we tend to think
of complicity as requiring purpose (not even knowledge will do) and it is certainly not my aim to
be hurt. Normatively, it seems to add insult to injury to say that someone who is being attacked
is also required to fight against that attack, lest she be dishonoring herself. There are good
reasons why the law of rape has moved away from the requirement of resistance to the utmost by
the victim to an understanding that women—some of whom suffer frozen fright—are just as
violated when they don’t fight back.
Although I think that we should not place a duty on the victim to resist, I think we can
still grant significance to the attitude expressed when one does resist. One’s behavior just is a
reassertion of oneself and one’s value. One is not required to do this, but we might still
understand that one is saying this by one’s actions. There is an expressive meaning that is
communicated by this act in reasserting one’s value in the face of attack.
12

This way of thinking about honor raises four questions. First, how does the aggressor
become “liable” to this expression of honor? Second, does this conception apply in Lucky
Escape? Third, how does it relate to necessity? Fourth, how does it survive the deferred
harming objection?
4. Liability and expressing honor
In some ways it seems obvious that one who fights back expresses or defends one’s
honor against one’s attacker. I don’t doubt that this is true. At this point, I wish only to express
the concern that we may need to avail ourselves of additional explanatory resources to articulate
why it is that Fran gets to harm Eric as a way of saying, “I respect myself and you ought to
respect me.” Although I will turn to the necessity question momentarily, for now, the question
on the table is simply why it is that the attacker must absorb a harm, a harm which is expressing
something. That is, we are asking whether Eric has forfeited a right against this sort of harming
where the justification for the harming is grounded neither in desert nor defense.
It may be that we get to say that when one violates another’s rights and does so culpably,
thereby manifesting disrespect, one cannot complain when the rejection of that message is
accomplished by force in reply. The alternative would be to say that actors do not forfeit rights
against expressions of honor. Rather, like deterrence, expressive reasons can only serve to
justify harms that the agent does not have a right against. Just as we may offer a deterrence
justification for punishing culpable actors, but not innocent ones, because the former have
forfeited rights that the latter have not, perhaps we may further expressive values when the actor
already has forfeited rights on other grounds.
5. Lucky Escape and the embedded alternative conception of honor
Lucky Escape raises a question that has often debated in criminal law theory and selfdefense, and this is the duty to retreat. Retreat has long been understood to be part of the
necessity calculation. Indeed, Larry Alexander has noted that criminal codes that do not require
retreat but do require that defenders use force only when necessary are internally inconsistent. 17
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The right to stand one’s ground, and not surrender a position that she lawfully holds, exists and
may be protected. But it must be protected proportionately. If the defender knows that she can
kill the aggressor to prevent herself from being killed or that she can step on the aggressor’s
instep to prevent herself from being killed but the latter increases the probability that she will
break a heel, then the defender may not kill because one cannot kill someone to protect a shoe. 18
Similarly, we might grant that there is an autonomy interest at work in Lucky Escape—and thus
in some sense an “honor” interest—allows the use of some force. Asking someone to jump off a
cliff—even with a parachute—is a lot to ask! And even if Victim could simply hide behind a
bush, you are asking him to yield a spot he lawfully occupies because another has threatened
him.19
The intersection of retreat and honor is contentious. I want to be clear that the way that
honor is initially employed by Statman, and the way that it intersects Rape, is different than the
way that honor is implicated in retreat cases. In retreat cases, the question is whether Victim
must run away20 or whether he may stay and fight. This second sense of honor shifts our
discussion from the fierceness of Fran, our resilient rape victim, to the thought of testosteronefilled, chest-beating contorted conceptions of masculinity. That said, it seems the distinction that
many jurisdictions in the United States adopt is the correct one. One may use nondeadly force
without retreating but may not use deadly force. The idea behind not requiring retreat in
nondeadly situations is that retreating allows aggressors to violate our rights by forcing us by
their wrongdoing to surrender where we may otherwise rightfully be and that retreating
encourages further aggression. We need not be indignant about our dignity to see these as
appropriate concerns.
This notion of defending honor—as defending one’s right to remain where one lawfully
stands—exists independently of the notion that the Murderer is dishonoring the Victim by
attacking him. Here, Victim is clearly defending his rightful space, and this is an interest that is
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properly taken into account in what Victim may defend in Lucky Escape.21 In contrast, I suspect
that the expressive value in “not giving up” in the face of defeat has no purchase in Lucky
Escape. To be sure, we have intuitions that the Victim is standing his ground in Lucky Escape,
but it seems that the value of expression in the face of certain loss simply does not obtain when
the Victim will lose nothing (or what little he will lose is better explained by a different
conception). There seems to be less poetic expression in shooting Murderer needlessly. One
might think that it is, well, dishonorable. It does not seem that even a wrist breaking is in order.
Hence, we might think that either (1) Murderer simply is not liable to any harm beyond what
Victim needs to stand his ground and/or (2) harming in this situation fails to express one’s honor.
6. Honor and necessity
Another problem for any notion of honor is whether it actually solves the necessity
problem or simply relocates it. Has Frowe, to use one of her favorite locutions, simply moved
the bump in the carpet? I think it depends on whether we have our finger on the correct framing
of what the defender is doing. To the extent that this is about defending honor as one would
defend against a physical threat, it does not seem that the case has been made that harm is
necessary. That is, if injurying Eric is sufficient to defend dignity, we might still wonder if it is
necessary. Fran could say, “You are raping me. I am not just a means to your end.” She could
sing a few bars of Whitney Houston’s The Greatest Love of All, “No matter what they take from
me. They can’t take away from dignity.” If she really wanted Eric to suffer, she might voice
activate her iPhone to play Mel Gibson in Braveheart shouting that “They can take our lives.
But they can’t take our freedom.” Why would physical harm be necessary to reassert herself as
an end in herself? Hence, even if Eric is liable to moderate harm as a matter of proportionality,
the necessity problem simply reasserts itself at the level of honor.
On the other hand, if fighting back is valuable because of the meaning of a tenacious
fight, then perhaps only some actions will do.22 Because blowing a raspberry just lacks the same
expressive function as breaking a wrist, we resolve the necessity quandary because the action
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reasserts honor as an end in itself, such that more assertion just is more meaning just is more
honor. The necessity objection may then dissolve.
7.

Deferred harming reprised

Finally, let us consider deferred harming.23 Even assuming we are talking about
otherwise futile defense cases, and even assuming that violence does assist in allowing the victim
to assert her honor, we must ask whether this conception rules out deferred harming. After all,
we have shifted from a notion of averting a threat to a notion of expressing one’s honor. But
why does that communication have to be contemporaneous with the attack? In the television
show, The Newsroom, a woman’s ex-boyfriend posts revenge porn on the internet. After he does
this and she is humiliated, she goes to his office, knees him in the groin, and punches him in the
face. Why would this action assert her honor if it is done while he is pushing send, but not
thereafter? Once the value is in the expression—and not in the prevention of dishonoring—the
requirement that the expression be contemporaneous seems ad hoc.
For the very reasons I suggested with respect to punitive reasons, I think that we should
simply embrace the thought that these reasons do remain in force even after the attack is over.
The fact that victims are required to stay their hands is simply a result of a political morality that
requires victims to yield to the state. In the absence of the state, do we really think that Fran fails
to express her honor if she breaks Eric’s wrist the next week? I doubt it.
8. Is Rape special?
One final question we should ask is whether Rape, which involves rape, contaminates
our intuitions. Maybe, outside of Rape, where there is a poignant physical struggle, a struggle
that so clearly borders on being defensive, we may simply reject that there is any expressive
value.24 To test this, we need a case where the defender is not involved in a physical, quasidefensive struggle.
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Poison. Kelly has surreptitiously given Victoria a slow acting poison. As the poison
begins to take effect, Kelly announces this to Victoria. Victoria can break Kelly’s wrist
before she dies.
Poison should present a strong challenge to both punitive reasons and honor expression.
Victoria is done for. Nothing she can do will stop it from being the case that Kelly has killed
her. Do we still think that Victoria may break Kelly’s wrist?
For those who adopt punitive reasons, it seems Victoria may. After all, harming Kelly
may have deterrence value. And, Kelly deserves punishment. (If you imagine that otherwise
Kelly will not be caught and will otherwise get away with murder, I suspect retributive intuitions
become even stronger, indicating that it is the role of the state, and the possibility of punishment,
that dampens intuitions here.)
Imagine that as Victoria is dying, Kelly is taunting her, explaining how she planned the
murder, how she will marry Victoria’s boyfriend, and so forth. Given that Eric is manifesting
substantial disrespect in raping Fran, we will need to embellish our case to approximate the
culpable disrespect involved here. Although I suspect that it is hard to distinguish expressive
value that could be seen as punishment that vindicates the value of the victim from simply an
assertion of the value of the victim, still, the permissibility of Victoria’s reassertion of her value
in the face of her inevitable death at Kelly’s hands seems plausible to me. That is, I do not take
Rape to present an exceptional case. Nevertheless, to retributivists who think that people who
culpable harm others deserve punishment, it is perhaps difficult which reason does the intuitive
work. (And to the extent that honor may only be defended when the aggressor is culpable, it is
impossible to isolate the reasons.)
Where are we? The claim that one’s use of force in futile defense cases constitutes a
defense of honor is an easy argument to make. However, to examine honor carefully, we must
assess the different strands to see how they connect. What attacks honor? Is honor defended or
asserted? Why is the aggressor liable? Why is force necessary? May the harming be deferred?
I do not expect that my brief survey of these questions has yielded definitive answers. I
do hope, however, to have advanced the inquiry such that when a theorist argues that defending
honor is a solution to the futile defense problem, the theorist will take pains to explain exactly
and precisely how honor is defended. I want to turn, however, to another puzzle that lurks
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beneath the surface of the honor defense, and this is the relationship between liability, intention,
and reasons.

IV.

Reasons, Reasons, Everywhere…But What Is Fran Thinking????
At this point, we should recognize that myriad reasons may justify Fran’s conduct.

Harming Eric may be justified as a matter of desert, as a matter of deterrence, and as a matter of
expressing her moral worth. And, perhaps all three of these reasons extend temporally beyond
the rape itself. Similarly, in Lucky Escape some harm is due and owing to Murderer as a matter
of desert, deterrence, defense of honor in standing one’s ground, and perhaps defense of honor in
other senses. I want to suggest the way that we should put these pieces together, a way that
would be congenial to Frowe’s positions and would offer a new challenge to punitive reasons.
Let’s consider Eric. Is Eric liable to defensive force? Frowe and I would both answer
affirmatively though I would say that Eric is only liable to force that Fran believes is defensively
required (this will matter for Lucky Escape later). Let’s assume Fran intends to defend herself.
But her breaking his wrist is futile. How should we understand this case?
I think the appropriate analysis of the situation is that Eric is liable but that the harm can’t
be all-things-considered permissible unless it is supported by reasons. Although I cannot argue
for the position here, I take reasons to be fact-relative. Mistakes are not reasons, even when
reasonably held. Because I am not inclined to go evidence-relative about necessity, I would say
there is no defensive reason here. An omniscient actor would say there is no defensive reason for
Fran to act.
But enter Frowe’s expression of honor. To the extent that the harming has intrinsic
value, and Eric is not wronged recall, that harming is supported by reasons.
What about punitive reasons? Well, Frowe is going to have to concede that defenders
deter aggression by fighting back. Whether this one does will depend on the actual facts. (Eric
is already liable to harm on Frowe’s account. The question is whether there are reasons to give
him the harm to which he is liable.)
When we reach retributive reasons, I think we have a problem. Are these reasons
available to Fran? Ordinarily, we don’t think that one is punishing if one does not act with a
punitive intention. Assume that Albert and Bob dislike Carl and decide they would like to beat
him up. Unbeknowst to them, Carl is a rapist who has not been caught and punished. When
18

Albert and Bob beat up Carl, unaware of the desert-based reason that obtains, are they punishing
him?25
Notably, Fran has a good intention unlike Albert and Bob, but it is still odd to think that
this counts as punishment. Unlike the deferred harming objection, then, this one might have
teeth.
Let me explain. Eric has forfeited rights against being injured defensively. I suspect that
Fran believes she is acting defensively. Eric cannot complain about these injuries because he
forfeited rights against them. However, just because an action will not wrong someone does not
mean that it is necessarily permissible. If, all things considered, there are not actual reasons that
support Fran’s actions, then she should not harm him.
Think of it this way. Assume that Eric was pointing an unloaded gun at Fran, but Fran
thought it was loaded. Fran might not wrong Eric by shooting him, but objectively, she kills
someone she did not need to kill. The same question would then arise. If she doesn’t need to kill
him defensively, are there still reasons that support (perhaps only partially) Fran’s harming Eric?
In either case, Fran could try to point to deterrence, desert, or maybe expressive value.
But then, what if she isn’t thinking of those reasons? Surely, deterrence still goes through
because injurying Eric counts as deterrence if it deters, not depending on what Fran thinks. But
does desert work the same way? Returning to the wrist breaking, can Fran’s conduct be
supported by the fact that Eric deserves (more than) a broken wrist if Fran isn’t thinking, “You
deserve this scumbag!” and is instead thinking, “Get the XXX off of me!”? We might be
tempted to think yes, but this is a bit of moral slippage, in taking one justifying reason that
usually requires that that justification be the intended (or known) goal and substituting it for the
actual motivating reason which would have been justifying had the facts been as the actor
believed them.
Of course, this question extends beyond punishment. We might likewise ask whether
expressing honor likewise requires an intention. Culpability doesn’t – the aggressor manifests
disrespect without needing to intend to manifest disrespect. But we do need to be clearer about
exactly what expressing honor, because some conceptions might make this reason unavailable to
Fran unless she acts with the express intention.
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To summarize the worry, then, Rape looks like a case where Fran intends to act
defensively, but she’s mistaken. Theorists are quick to offer alternative accounts of the deepseated intuition that Fran may act despite the fact that defensive force is futile. They offer other
reasons, reasons that do obtain, to justify the harm. My concern is that not all of these reasons
are reasons that have force merely by existing. Rather, sometimes these reasons need to be
intended or known before they are available. This may mean that the quest to justify Fran’s
conduct is somewhat more complicated than it first appears. 26

V.

Counter-Defense
My final question is whether we should be on board with Frowe’s approach to Lucky

Escape. Frowe takes a somewhat peculiar path in Lucky Escape that ought to be more carefully
parsed. One result that Frowe thinks we ought to reach is that Murderer cannot kill Victim in
Lucky Escape. However, Frowe does think that Murderer can fight back against disproportionate
force. I believe that this conclusion is incorrect on the terms of Frowe’s own argument.
Moreover, I worry that Frowe’s cabining of her inquiry (ignoring other resources that might
explain some of these situations) blocks from view a better explanation of the moral landscape.
Frowe argues that Murderer is liable in Lucky Escape, arguing for what she calls
“externalism” about necessity. Though I agree with Frowe that the necessity limitation is not
best seen as an internal limit on liability, I wonder whether the internalism/externalism debate is
the most perspicuous way to see this. Ultimately, the question is whether liability requires not
just forfeiture but a reason (understood objectively) for engaging in the conduct. The
relationship between liability and reasons is underexamined. One could thereby contrast Tadros’
duty approach, where one has an obligation to engage in the action, with McMahan’s approach,
where one must have an instrumental defensive reason, with my approach that liability ought to
include only forfeiture.27 On my view, once there is forfeiture, then, the question is how the fact
26
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that the defender’s conduct will not constitute a rights violation links to the determination of allthings-considered permissibility. Necessity then serves as a limit to the extent that we think that
the interests of culpable aggressors remain, even if their rights not to be harmed do not. Frowe’s
“proportionate means externalism” is thus better expressed as a claim about rights forfeiture
(liability) and a recognition that harming, and the extent of harming, must be supported by
reasons (“proportionate means”).
With Lucky Escape, killing Murderer is not supported by reasons. Although I share
Frowe’s “externalism,” I part company with Frowe in thinking that internalists lack the resources
to explain why Murderer cannot fight back. As I’ve argued previously, individuals who start
fights may lose defensive rights despite the fact that the responder still wrongs the provocateur
by injuring him.28 We can maintain that Murderer started it and so cannot defend while
simultaneously judging Victim’s actions to be impermissible. Given that this is the widespread
position across states and therefore arguably represents the considered judgment of a large
populace, it strikes me that philosophers would be wise to devote at least a paragraph to
considering whether there is any wisdom to the approach.
Irrespective of whether Frowe finds the provocateur explanation to be plausible, there
remains the problem that Frowe’s analysis fails on its own terms. She maintains that Murderer is
liable to be killed, but such a killing is not all-things-considered permissible. But to Frowe that
is not the end of the matter because Murderer is liable to some force as a matter of Victim
defending his honor. So, some harming is permissible, and the Murderer cannot defend against
that. But what if Victim goes overboard and uses more force than is justified to defend his
honor? Frowe then maintains that Murderer can defend himself. “He may therefore use force to
defend himself only against the excess harm that exceeds what victim may inflict in defending
his honour.” (118). Murderer therefore has a “limited right of counter-defence.” (118).
I find this result curious. The root of the trouble, I think, is that using internalism and
externalism obscures the relationship between liability and reasons.
Consider an examples of the relationship between rights and reasons. My neighbor wants
to access the street behind my house by walking on my grass. Begrudgingly, I consent. Now, if
forfeiture so as not to conflate different moral notions). See also Jeff McMahan, ‘The Limits of Self-Defense’, in
Michael Weber and Christian Coons, (eds.), The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming) (arguing liability is instrumental).
28
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my neighbor has another way to access the street that does not trample my grass, then that is the
way that he ought to go. But am I entitled to push him off my grass to enforce this lesser-evil?
Or having waived my right am I prevented from any further enforcement of the very same
interest at stake? The question is what to make of an interest that is not protected by a right
when harming that interest is still all-things-considered impermissible. 29
The Murderer’s interest is not protected by a right. He gave it up by attacking. On
Frowe’s view, Murderer is liable to deadly force. The reason why deadly force may not be used
is because although the Murderer is liable, it is not all-things-considered permissible and this is
because reasons only support using force that is necessary. But the question is whether interests
that are not protected by rights – because those rights have been forfeited or waived—may be
asserted as interests by the very agents who forfeited or waived their interests. I would think that
a comprehensive view of what it means to forfeit or waive a right includes the inability to assert
the interest that was protected by that right.30 My allowance of my neighbor’s walking across
my grass prevents me from stopping him or complaining about the harm to my interests even if
all-things-considered he ought not to walk across my grass. It is then an interesting question
(and one I cannot pursue) whether third parties may intervene to prevent harm to such interests.
Because I adopt intention internalism, that is I require the defender to believe her action
is necessary to defend against the harm irrespective of whether it is, I would deny that Murderer
is liable to deadly force because I find it hard to believe that Victim himself believes that his
action is defensive. Instead, the question for me would then be whether Murderer provoked the
use of deadly force such that he forfeits his defensive rights. On my view, Murderer is wronged
by Victim’s use of unnecessary force but cannot defend against it. On Frowe’s view, Murderer
is not wronged by Victim’s use of unnecessary force but may nevertheless defend against it on
lesser evils principles. Even if she chooses to reject a provocateur principle, Frowe’s view that
Murderer is liable should require that Murderer stay his hand, even if the force is ultimately
impermissible.
******
The necessity limitation stands at the crossroads of forfeiture and all-things-considered
permissibility. We must know its role in determining whether the aggressor has forfeited and its
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Hence, the idea that consent is in some sense the waiver of one’s right of complaint.
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role in supporting reasons to use force against those who have forfeited or waived their rights.
Our quest to find reasons that might support Fran’s use of force is only the first step in a larger
inquiry.
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